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Extraordinary Writs: A Powerful Tool for the
Florida Practitioner
BENNETt H. BRUMMER,* PAUL MORRIS** AND ANDREW ROSEN***
This article explores the distinctive nature of extraordinary
writs and their availability in the Florida courts. Recent deci-
sional and statutory law in this area is analyzed in detail. The
authors' presentation affords Florida practitioners valuable
guidelines for the effective invocation of extraordinary writs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the nature of extraordinary writs in Flor-
ida, placing particular emphasis on recent developments.' The arti-
cle also examines the jurisdiction of the courts to issue extraordinary
writs and the procedures governing their use under the Florida Rules
of Appellate Procedure, which took effect on March 1, 1978.
II. MANDAMUS
A. Nature
The writ of mandamus is issued to command performance of a
preexisting, public ministerial duty.' The petitioner must demon-
strate a clear legal right to commission of the particular duty in
question.' An actual default must be demonstrated before the writ
will issue; threats of future violation of a duty will not suffice.,
Where the respondent has discretion to act, however, mandamus
will lie to assure that such discretion is exercised in a sound and
lawful manner.'
Mandamus is a high prerogative writ granted in the sound dis-
cretion of the court' and is available only if.no other adequate legal
remedy exists.7 The sufficiency of alternative means of relief is de-
termined in light of the particular facts and circumstances of each
case.'
1. Extraordinary writs are very efficacious tools for Florida practitioners. These writs,
however, cannot be characterized as a group because each represents a residual remedy which
does not come into play unless standard modes of relief are unavailable. This article, there-
fore, delineates the individual traits of extraordinary writs and discusses their respective uses
in the Florida courts. See generally Adams & Miller, Origins and Current Florida Status of
the Extraordinary Writs, 4 U. FLA. L. REV. 421 (1951).
2. A purely ministerial duty involves no element of discretion or exercise of judgment;
its performance is clearly and specifically required by law. State'ex rel. Long v. Carey, 121
Fla. 515, 530, 164 So. 199, 207 (1935).
3. State ex rel. Evans v. Chappel, 308 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975).
4. McConihe v. State ex rel. McMurray, 17 Fla. 238, 272 (1879).
5. Moore v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 289 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1974).
6. State ex rel. Long v. Carey, 121 Fla. 515, 164 So. 199 (1935).
7. Id. at 529, 164 So. at 206.
8. Scussel v. Kelly, 152 So. 2d 767, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), quashed on other grounds
1046 [Vol. 33:1045
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
B. Jurisdiction
Article V of the Constitution of the State of Florida authorizes
the circuit courts,' the district courts of appeal0 and the supreme
court" to issue writs of mandamus. The writ will not lie in an appel-
late court, however, where factual issues exist which require the
taking of testimony. 2 Moreover, the jurisdiction of the supreme
court is expressly limited to cases in which the principal relief
sought is against a state officer or agency.
3
C. Uses
Mandamus has been invoked to command performance of a
variety of duties, including court compliance with proper proce-
dures," enforcement of constitutional rights,15 determination of the
constitutionality of legislation," acceptance of complaints for fil-
ing," disclosure of public records,"8 dismissal of criminal charges on
the basis of immunity," reinstatement of improperly dismissed ap-
peals," speedy trial of an out-of-state prisoner,2 proper crediting by
prison authorities of the time a defendant spent in jail,22 and en-
forcement of judgments against municipal corporations.2 3
More recently, the Supreme Court of Florida held in Gulf Pines
Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Memorial Park, Inc.,"4 that a peti-
167 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1964).
9. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
10. Id. § 4(b)(3).
11. Id. § 3(b)(5).
12. State ex rel. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Board of Comm'rs, 254 So. 2d 195 (Fla.
1971). Writs which raise an issue of fact, requiring the taking of testimony, will not be heard
by an appellate court because an appellate court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing issues
of law in the final decree of the trial court. See FLA. R. App. P. 4.5(a)(2); FLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 5(b).
13. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5); see, e.g., Petit v. Adams, 211 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1968)
(no jurisdiction in supreme court because principal relief sought was against county officers).
14. State ex rel. Dillman v. Tedder, 123 Fla. 188, 166 So. 590 (1936); State ex rel. Zuberi
v. Brinker, 323 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
15. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 83 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1955).
16. State ex rel. Allen v. Harlow, 72 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1954).
17. McConihe v. State ex rel. McMurray, 17 Fla. 238 (1879); State ex rel. Kaufman v.
Sutton, 231 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).
18. Gannett Co. v. Goldtrap, 302 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
19. State ex rel. Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1973).
20. State ex rel. Gaines Constr. Co. v. Pearson, 154 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1963).
21. Dickey v. Circuit Court, 200 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1967).
22. Adams v. Wainwright, 275 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1973).
23. Peacock v. State ex rel. American Mortgage & Fin. Co., 122 Fla. 25, 164 So. 680
(1935).
24. 361 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1978).
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tioner may simultaneously seek mandamus and declaratory relief.
The court reasoned that "to hold otherwise would contravene not
only the plain language of the statute but the declarations of the
Florida courts and of the legislature to the effect that the declara-
tory judgment statute should be liberally construed."25 .
In State ex rel. Gerstein v. Schwartz,2 the Supreme Court of
Florida issued a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to finger-
print convicted felons in accordance with statutory requirements.
The court ruled that the statute did not unconstitutionally infringe
upon the power of the state's judicial branch and, therefore, the trial
court had a duty to comply with its provisions.
Similarly, in D'Alessandro v. Shearer,27 the trial court had re-
fused to comply with a statute which mandated the sentencing of
defendants to. fixed minimum terms upon conviction of certain of-
fenses. Rejecting the trial court's contention that the statute was
unconstitutional, the supreme court issued a writ of mandamus
directing the lower court to enter new sentencing orders in compli-
ance with the statute.
In Mellor v. Arakgui," mandamus was utilized to compel the
circuit court clerk to issue a certificate terminating the jurisdiction
of a medical mediation panel. Because the panel had held no hear-
ing within six months from the date on which the claim was filed,
its jurisdiction had lapsed. The petitioners were entitled, therefore,
to pursue the cause of action in the circuit court."
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed a cir-
cuit court's issuance of the writ to compel county commissioners to
approve a plat of land. The court concluded that the commissioners
had acted arbitrarily because all legal prerequisites for approval had
been met.1
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, upheld the use
of mandamus relief to command issuance of a municipal building
permit." In so holding, the district court affirmed the circuit court
judge's invalidation of a zoning ordinance which the city had con-
tended barred issuance of the permit.
25. Id. at 699 (footnotes omitted).
26. 357 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1978).
27. 360 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1978).
28. 359 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
29. Cf. Stanton v. Community Hosp., 359 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (same issue
presented in a petition for writ of prohibition which successfully sought to prevent a medical
mediation panel from hearing a claim after the six-month period had elapsed).
30. Broward County v. Narco Realty, 'Inc., 359 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
31. City of St. Petersburg v. Austin, 355 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
1048 [Vol. 33:1045
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A grant of mandamus relief to compel a city utility commission
to release records and documents in its possession to a utility com-
pany pursuant to the Public Records Act32 was affirmed by the
District Court of Appeal, First District." Although the pertinent
provisions of the Act were deemed mandatory and nondiscretionary,
the court assert6d that mandamus would not lie to compel disclo-
sure of documents because fundamental privacy interests out-
weighed the right to disclosure."
ImI. PRoHmrrION
A. Nature
The writ of prohibition is narrow in scope. 35 It may be issued
by a superior court solely to prevent a lower court or tribunal from
exercising jurisdiction with which it has not been vested by law."0
Proceedings in a lower tribunal which do not involve jurisdictional
questions, therefore, are not proper objects of a prohibition action
even though they may constitute reversible error.3" The writ may not
be invoked to preclude a lower court from erroneously exercising its
legally conferred jurisdiction;- nor will it lie to challenge an order
previously entered.8' Ordinarily, however, it is available to prevent
the commission of a future act. 0
Prohibition is a high prerogative writ granted in the sound dis-
cretion of the court. It may be invoked only where the petitioner
lacks other adequate means to redress or to prevent wrongful actions
by the lower tribunal." If alternative but inadequate remedies exist,
prohibition will lie.'2 The writ is unavailable, however, at the appel-
late level because resolution of factual issues requiring the taking
of testimony is sought.
Generally, an objection or ruling in the lower tribunal is not a-
32. FLA. STAT. § 119.01 -. 12 (1975).
33. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 353 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
34. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d 83
(Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
35. The writ will issue only to prevent judicial or quasijudicial action, as distinguished
from legislative, executive or ministerial action. See State ex rel. Swearingen v. Railroad
Comm'rs, 79 Fla. 526, 84 So. 444 (1920).
36. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977).
37. White v. State ex rel. Johnson, 160 Fla. 965, 37 So. 2d 580 (1948).
38. Burkhart v. Circuit Court, 146 Fla. 457, 1 So. 2d 872 (1941).
39. State ex rel. R.C. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Boyd, 114 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1959).
40. Id.
41. Burkhart v. Circuit Court, 146 Fla. 457, 1 So. 2d 872 (1941).
42. Scussel v. Kelly, 152 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), quashed on other grounds, 167
So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1964).
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prerequisite to prohibition relief since jurisdictional defects relating
to subject matter are not waivable.13 Nevertheless, in view of the
discretionary nature of the writ, it is advisable to present the juris-
dictional issue to the lower tribunal whenever feasible.
B. Jurisdiction
Article V of the Constitution of the State of Florida authorizes
the circuit courts," the district courts of appeal 5 and the supreme
court" to issue writs of prohibition. The jurisdiction of the supreme
court, however, is expressly limited to "causes within the jurisdic-
tion of the supreme court to review."' 7 Neither the circuit nor dis-
trict courts are subject to such a jurisdictional restriction.
Recently, in State ex rel. Sarasota County v. Boyer," the Su-
preme Court of Florida defined the parameters of its power to grant
prohibition relief directed to the district courts of appeal. Article V
limits the authority of the supreme court to grant such relief to only
those causes within its jurisdiction to review. Decisions of the dis-
trict courts so included are those "initially and directly passing on
the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty, or
construing a provision of the state or federal constitution."'" The
court rejected the contention that the requirement, as construed,
was overly restrictive of its prohibition jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
district courts of appeal. Denying a request to interpret narrowly the
power, the court declared: "It cannot be known whether a district
court decision will pass on a statute's validity or construe the Con-
stitution so as to give jurisdiction to review, until the decision has
been rendered." 0 The court cited three cases in which it had enter-
tained requests for prohibition relief directed to district courts of
appeal." It found that adoption of the restrictive constitutional in-
43. State ex rel. Garrett v. Whitehurst, 122 Fla. 484, 490, 165 So. 691, 693 (1936).
44. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
45. Id. § 4(b)(3).
46. Id. § 3(b)(4).
47. Id.
48. 360 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1978).
49. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
50. 360 So. 2d at 392. Prohibition is a preventive writ, which will not lie to attack or to
revoke an order once entered. Therefore, after decision is rendered so as to create jurisdiction
in the supreme court for its review, issuance of the writ is precluded.
51. State ex reL. Florida Dep't of Natural Resources v. District Court of Appeal, 355 So.
2d 772 (Fla. 1978) (holding that prohibition power was validly invoked to prevent district
court of appeal from hearing petition for review of agency action where filing of petition was
untimely); State ex rel. Shevin v. Rawls, 326 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1976) (finding that prohibition
relief was extended properly to consider dismissal of an appeal where notice was prematurely
filed); State ex rel. Shevin v. Rawls, 290 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1974) (ruling prohibition was used
[Vol. 33:1045
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terpretation would have rendered the court powerless to issue such
writs in these and other cases. The court further noted that such
interpretation "would open to challenge suggestions for prohibition
in an equally significant group of cases in trial courts."52
C. Relation Between Mandamus and Prohibition
The similarities between prohibition and mandamus have gen-
erated much discussion. The Supreme Court of Florida has stated
that the writs "in many instances have been used interchange-
ably." 3 This is true, however, only in cases which present jurisdic-
tional issues. In such instances, mandamus may lie to compel dis-
missal by the lower tribunal of an action over which it lacks jurisdic-
tion, while prohibition may issue to prevent the exercise of unlawful
jurisdiction." Apart from this context, the two remedies possess
distinct prerequisites and objectives. Mandamus may be invoked
against an individual to command performance of a preexisting,
ministerial public duty; prohibition may lie against a tribunal to
prevent usurpation or exercise of jurisdiction with which it is not
vested by law.
D. Uses
Florida courts have granted prohibition relief to prevent a trial
on the following grounds: double jeopardy, 5 collateral estoppel,"
correctly to determine whether right to appeal was lost where timely filing of notice of appeal
was made in wrong district court of appeal).
52. State ex rel. Sarasota County v. Boyer, 360 So. 2d 388, 391 (Fla. 1978); see, e.g.,
Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1977). In Reino, the court granted prohibition directed
to the trial court where defendant had been charged with commission of a capital crime. The
jurisdiction of the supreme court to issue prohibition relief was predicated on FLA. CONST.
art. V, § 3(b)(1), which authorizes the court to "hear appeals from final judgments of trial
courts imposing the death penalty." Prohibition was deemed to lie even though no final
judgment or sentence of the lower tribunal evidencing appellate jurisdiction in the supreme
court had yet been entered. Furthermore, petitioner's claim that the lower tribunal lacked
authority to impose the death penalty did not bar the court's exercise of jurisdiction because
the crucial issue involved the trial court's conclusion that the applicable statute of limitations
permitted prosecution for a capital offense any time. Note, however, that the court found the
jurisdictional argument to have been "novel and not without doubt." 352 So. 2d at 855; cf.
Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745, 747 n.2 (Fla. 1977) (expressly declining to decide whether
district court of appeal might also be an appropriate forum in such a case).
53. Wincor v. Turner, 215 So. 2d 3, 5 (Fla. 1968). The supreme court determined that
petitioner was able to invoke mandamus even though he could have elected to use prohibition.
Thus, a petitioner who has been denied prohibition relief cannot seek mandamus relief on
the same grounds. State ex rel. Kovnot v. Ferguson, 313 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1975).
54. Wincor v. Turner, 215 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1968).
55. State ex rei. Williams v. Grayson, 90 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1956).
56. McCray v. State, 350 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
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violation of defendant's immunity from prosecution57 or right to a
speedy trial,u bias of the preaiding judge,69 improper contempt cita-
tion by the judge,'" and expiration of the presiding judge's tempo-
rary appointment to the bench.'
More recently, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that prohibition may be invoked to challenge the lack of juris-
diction in a medical mediation panel because the aggrieved party
has no other adequate remedy to cure such fundamental error.6"
In State ex rel. Wilhoit v. Wells, 6 3 prohibition relief was granted
to a defendant in a criminal proceeding in which the trial court had
set aside a nolo contendere plea after having formally accepted it.
Because such repudiation would have placed the defendant twice in
jeopardy, the district court found no jurisdiction in the trial court
to reject the plea after its approval.
In State v. Reasbeck,11 the state successfully petitioned for pro-
hibition relief to prevent acceptance by the trial judge of a plea
agreement which the state had withdrawn prior to formal court
approval. The trial court had erroneously viewed the state as bound
by its plea.
IV. Quo WARRANTO
A. Nature
The writ of quo warranto is issued "to test the right of a person
to hold an office or franchise or exercise some right or privilege, the
peculiar powers of which are derived from the State."63
The Attorney General of the State of Florida may institute quo
warranto proceedings on behalf of the state. In the event that the
attorney general refuses either to commence such action in the name
of the state upon the claimant's relation, or refuses to designate the
claimant as the person rightfully entitled to the position, anyone
claiming title to an office held by another may file petition for the
writ." If the attorney general initiates quo warranto proceedings
57. Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1977).
58. Sibert v. Hare, 276 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
59. State ex reL Aguiar v. Chappell, 344 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
60. State ex rel. Gillham v. Phillips, 193 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
61. State ex rel. Wesley Constr. Co. v. O'Connell, 347 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
62. Hubacher v. Landry, 360 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). See also Stanton v. Com-
munity Hosp., 359 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
63. 356 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
64. 359 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
65. Winter v. Mack, 142 Fla. 1, 8, 194 So. 225, 228 (1940).
66. FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (Supp. 1978); see Austin v. State ex rel. Christian, 310 So. 2d 289
(Fla. 1975).
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naming the individual entitled to the office or if proceedings are
commenced upon the relation of a party claiming title, the action
may not be dismissed without the claimant's consent."
A judgment obtained in a quo warranto proceeding instituted
without the consent of the attorney general is conclusive as between
all parties to the action except the state."8 Thus, it does not bar the
subsequent initiation of such proceedings by the state." Judgment
rendered in a quo warranto action brought by the attorney general
does not preclude filing of claims by nonparies.0
Quo warranto is a remedial as well as a prerogative writ 7 which,
on a proper showing, may issue for purposes beyond those for which
it was originally conceived.7" Quo warranto relief will not be granted,
however, where an otherwise worthy claimant is guilty of laches or
where the public would suffer injury or confusion thereby.7"
The exclusiveness of quo warranto distinguishes it from nearly
all other extraordinary writs. In a case where quo warranto is avail-
able, it is, absent a statute to the contrary, the only proper remedy. 74
B. Jurisdiction
The Constitution of the State of Florida authorizes the circuit
courts, 7 district courts of appeal 7l and the supreme court 77 to issue
writs of quo warranto. As in mandamus, the supreme court is only
empowered to issue the writ of quo warranto to state officers and
agencies. 78
67. FLA. STAT. § 80.02 (Supp. 1978).
68. Id. § 80.04.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. A prerogative writ is one which is issued in the discretion of the court on behalf of
the state. A remedial writ is a civil action or proceeding brought to enforce a legal right issued
in the name or on behalf of the state at the instigation of an individual who has an interest
in the matter. See generally W. BAnuzY, A TREATSE ON THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS AND SPECIAL
REMEDIES §§ 315, 355 (1913).
72. State ex rel. Pooser v. Wester, 126 Fla..49, 170 So. 736 (1936).
73. Id.
74. State ex rel. Ellis v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 57 Fla. 533, 48 So. 639 (1908); cf.
Bloomfield v. City of St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1955) (holding that declaratory
relief was properly sought to resolve contest for political control of city). Quo warranto was
not the exclusive remedy because the issues were not limited to trying title to an office. The
declaratory judgment proceeding also sought to "bring an expeditious termination to the
public confusion." Id. at 369.
75. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
76. Id. § 4(b)(3).
77. Id. § 3(b)(5).
78. Id.
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
C. Uses
Quo warranto has often been invoked to challenge the title to
authority of elected" and appointed s officials, and to seek relief
where a municipality has improperly exercised jurisdiction or con-
trol over land." Quo warranto is also available to ascertain which
powers of an office derive from the state. In a recent quo warranto
proceeding entertained by the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, the court determined that a state attorney lacks authority to
represent the State of Florida in an interpleader action brought in
federal court. 2 In so holding, the court made it clear that the attor-
ney general is the sole official empowered to represent the State of
Florida in an action in federal court.
V. CORAM NOBIS
A. Nature
The writ of coram nobis may issue only in a criminal case."3 It
serves the purpose of correcting a judgment based upon an error of
fact unknown to the court, counsel or parties at the time and which,
if known, would have prevented the conviction. s4 The party seeking
the writ, however, must have no alternative remedy.8 1
The recent interpretation of rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure to permit challenges to judgments on the basis
of newly discovered evidence, has caused conflict regarding the
availability of coram nobis. In State v. Gomez,"8 the District Court
of Appeal, Third District, held that collateral attack of a conviction
on grounds of newly discovered evidence is available through a rule
79. See, e.g., Treiman v. Malmquist, 342 So.. 2d 972 (Fla. 1977); State ex rel. Askew v.
Thomas, 293 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1974); State ex rel. Judicial Qualification Comm'n v. Rose, 286
So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1973).
80. E.g., Austin v. State ex rel. Christian, 310 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1975); Carey v. State,
349 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
81. E.g., Orange County v. City of Orlando, 327 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1976); City of South Miami
v. State ex rel. Landis, 140 Fla. 740, 192 So. 624 (1939).
82. State ex rel. Shevin v. Weinstein, 353 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
83. The writ was abolished in civil actions by FLA. R. Ctv. P. 1.540; see Ohio Cas. Group
v. Parrish, 350 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1977).
84. Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1957) (juror misconduct discovered after the trial);
Nickels v. State, 86 Fla. 208, 98 So. 502 (1923) (accused forced to plead guilty out of well-
grounded fear of mob violence).
The writ cannot reach error in matters of law. The party seeking relief must apply to
the same court in which judgment was entered. Petitioner must show that if the matters
presented had been before the trial court at the time of judgment, the conviction would have
been precluded and that the party seeking the writ would have had no other remedy.
85. Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1957).
86. 363 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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3.850 motion or through a petition for writ of coram nobis. In so
ruling, the court expressly rejected District Court of Appeal, Second
District decisions which had specified coram nobis as the only
means of effectuating such an attack.87 The Gomez holding, how-
ever, comports with dicta in decisions of both the Supreme Court
of Florida 8 and the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District.
An application for coram nobis should be made on sworn peti-
tion. 0 Moreover, the petitioner carries the burden of demonstrating
existence of the facts in question by "strong and convincing proof."9'
B. Jurisdiction
Permission to seek a writ of coram nobis in the trial court must
be sought and granted by the appellate court which previously had
entertained the appeal from final judgment.2 In cases in which no
appeal was taken, application should be filed in the trial court.9 3
The authority of the courts to entertain requests for coram
nobis relief derives from section 2.01 of the Florida Statutes which
provides:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general
and not a local nature. . . are declared to be of force in this state;
provided, the said statutes and common law be not inconsistent
87. Hallman v. State, 343 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Hamilton v. State, 237 So. 2d
255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). Hallman was approved by the Supreme Court of Florida in Hallman
v. State, 1979 FLA. L. WEEKLY 121 (Fla. Mar. 15) (No. 51,633). The supreme court held that
the decision of the Second District was not in conflict with Fast v. State, 221 So. 2d 203 (Fla.
3d DCA 1969), and thus declined to review the decision via conflict certiorari. The court
treated Hallman's request for certiorari review as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
In denying the writ, the court noted that the alleged facts were not of such a vital nature
that had the trial court known them, they "conclusively" would have prevented the entry of
judgment.
88. State v. Matera, 266 So. 2d 661, 667 (Fla. 1972) (indicating that newly discovered
evidence, e.g., perjury, could constitute valid ground for post-conviction relief under FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.850).
89. Tolar v. State, 196 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), wherein the court stated: "Post-
conviction motions for relief collaterally attacking judgments and sentences under Criminal
Procedure Rule No. 1 [the predecessor to rule 3.8501 are basically in the nature of writs of
error coram nobis." Id. at 3.
90. Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1957). The application may be accompanied by a
supporting affidavit delineating the facts "which would vitiate the verdict and ... show the
evidence upon which the required facts can be proved and the source thereof." Id. at 598.
91. Id.
92. Id.; Hallman v. State, 343 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). In such cases, the appellate
court determines the legal effect of the allegations. If the allegations are deemed sufficient,
the petitioner is granted leave to apply to the court for the writ. The trial court then deter-
mines the truth of the allegations.
93. Durley v. Mayo, 160 Fla. 922, 37 So. 2d 320 (1948).
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with the constitution and laws of the United States and the acts
of the legislature of this state."
VI. HABEAS CORPUS
A. Nature
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, which is granted to
determine whether the detention of an individual is legal.9 5 Habeas
is designed to provide a speedy" remedy without cost 7 for those
persons illegally held.8 Mere irregularities or errors of procedure,
however, are not grounds for discharge. 9 Where a motion pursuant
to rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure or any other
proceeding affords the petitioner an adequate alternative remedy,
habeas is not available. 1'"
When properly issued, habeas supersedes all other writs.10' A
judgment in habeas corpus becomes absolute unless reviewed by the
appropriate appellate court and, if not reversed, the judgment is res
judicata as to the lawfulness of custody."0 2
B. Jurisdiction
The supreme court or any justice thereof may issue writs of
habeas corpus returnable before the supreme court or any justice, a
district court of appeal or any judge thereof, or any circuit court
judge."3 A district court of appeal or any judge thereof may issue
writs of habeas corpus returnable before the district court, or before
94. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1975), quoted in Farrell v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 408,
410 (Fla. 1978).
95. Sneed v. Mayo, 69 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1954).
96. The writ of habeas corpus "shall be returnable without delay." FLA. CONST. art. I, §
13.
97. Id.
98. State ex rel. Gerstein v. Schulz, 180 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). A defendant in
a criminal case, however, is entitled to habeas relief despite the fact that he may not be
released if the conviction is successfully attacked and that outstanding concurrent sentences
are unchallenged. Frizzell v. State, 238 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1970).
99. State ex rel. Giblin v. Sullivan, 157 Fla. 496, 26 So. 2d 509 (1946). Discharge is
proper, however, if the judgment or process under which the petitioner is held is void. Id.
100. State ex rel. Wilkins v. Sinclair, 162 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1964); Boyd v. Cochran, 118
So. 2d 627 (Fla 1960); Hollingshead v. Mayo, 79 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1955).
101. State ex rel. Stringer v. Quigg, 91 Fla. 197, 107 So. 409 (1926). Habeas corpus
proceedings were brought to test the legality of the detention of a fugitive under an executive
warrant of extradition. The court stated that, upon service of the writ, "the executive warrant
of extradition under which the prisoner was originally held is suspended," and that until
disposition of the writ, the prisoner is detained solely by the authority of the writ of habeas
corpus. Id. at 211, 107 So. at 414.
102. Taylor v. Wainwright, 178 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1965).
103. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6).
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any circuit court judge within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. 04 The circuit courts are also empowered to issue writs of
habeas corpus.'
The relative ease with which the circuit court can resolve fac-
tual issues should be considered; nevertheless, appellate courts are
authorized to appoint commissioners to make factual findings. 0'
Additionally, a circuit court may not review by habeas corpus an
order of a court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction, unless
the decree is illegal or void. 07
C. Uses
Legislative enactments authorize the use of habeas corpus in
regard to detention of juveniles, 108 patients in mental hospitals, 09
patients in mental retardation facilities,"0 patients in drug treat-
ment centers"' and patients in alcoholic treatment facilities.12
These provisions, however, do not affect the availability of the
writ"' in other proceedings."' Habeas has been used: to challenge
an out of state detainer,"8 to recover a child withheld from a person
entitled to custody,"' to attack extradition,"7 and to vindicate cer-
tain deprivations of the right to appeal.1 18
Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida afforded habeas relief
to a defendant who, after conviction, was discovered to have been a
mentally disordered sex offender."' The trial court transferred the
defendant to a state hospital, pronouncing a sentence which he
would be required to serve after treatment. The supreme court de-
104. Id. § 4(b)(3).
105. Id. § 5(b).
106. State v. Wooden, 246 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 1971).
107. State ex rel. Scaldeferri v. Sandstrom, 285 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1973); Lederer ex reL.
Gravina v. Stack, 294 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
108. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(7)(a) (Supp. 1978).
109. Id. § 394.459(10).
110. Id. § 393.11(4).
111. Id. § 397.052(7).
112. Id. § 396.102(10).
113. The writ of habeas corpus "shall never be suspended unless, in case of rebellion or
invasion, suspension is essential to the public safety." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
114. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. Cootner, 44 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1950) (holding that legisla-
ture cannot alter the scope of habeas corpus and that a statute providing for habeas corpus
relief does not narrow or expand availability of the writ).
115. Grayson v. Wainwright, 330 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1976).
116. Coker v. Montgomery, 238 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) (inquiry limited to review
of governor's determinaton that jurisdictional prerequisites to issuance of writ exist).
117. State v. Cox, 306 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
118. Baggett v. Wainwright, 229 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1969).
119. Gammill v. Wainwright, 357 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1978).
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termined that the applicable sex offender statute mandated defer-
ring imposition of sentence until the completion of treatment. In so
doing, the court reaffirmed the rule that a defendant may, at any
time, contest by habeas corpus the pronouncement of a future sen-
tence.
VII. ALL WRrrs
A. Nature and Jurisdiction
Invocation of the "all writs" provision is generally limited to the
prevention of irreparable harm in emergency situations. 12 0 Cases
involving "great public interest where emergencies and seasonable
considerations are involved that require expedition" may qualify for
relief.''
The supreme court is authorized to issue "all writs necessary
to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction."'2 The circuit courts and
district courts of appeal are similarly empowered.' In State ex rel.
Watson v. Lee,' the supreme court construed the above quoted
statutory language as referring "only to ancillary writs" which could
not be issued "until jurisdiction is acquired."'2 Although this re-
strictive holding, which limited the availability of all writs relief to
causes in which jurisdiction had been acquired, was eventually over-
ruled in Couse v. Canal Authority, 'I the court has since noted that
the writ "remains-ancillary in nature.' ' 27
Jurisdiction to issue all writs relief was seemingly expanded in
Monroe Education Association v. Clerk, District Court of Appeal,
Third District.1A The Clerk of the Third District had refused to
accept a filing fee and application for all writs relief on the ground
that the application was not ancillary to any matter pending in the
court. The supreme court ruled that all writs relief was not so lim-
ited and that "the application for a constitutional writ should be
120. Wingate v. Mach, 114 Fla. 380, 154 So. 192 (1934).
121. Monroe Educ. Ass'n v. Clerk, Dist. Court of Appeal, Third Dist., 299 So. 2d 1, 3
(Fla. 1974).
122. F-... Co-sP. firt. V, § 3(b)(4).
123. A district court "may issue writs of mandamus, 4Z rtiorari, prohibition, quo warranto
and other writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction." &d. § 4(b)(3). The
circuit courts may issue "all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of their
jurisdiction." Id. § 5(b).
124. 150 Fla. 496, 8 So. 2d 19 (1942).
125. Id. at 500-01, 8 So. 2d at 21.
126. 209 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1968).
127. Monroe Educ. Ass'n. v. Clerk, Dist. Court of Appeal, Third Dist., 299 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1974).
128. Id.
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accepted for filing and duly considered under the discretionary ju-
risdiction that appertains in such situations.' 29 Among the numer-
ous cases cited by the court in support of its holding was State ex
rel. Turner v. Earle, 3 0 wherein all writs relief was granted in a cause
over which the court had no jurisdiction save by the "all writs"
provision.
Continuing its reliance upon the overruled language of State ex
rel. Watson v Lee,'3 the Supreme Court of Florida denied relief in
Shevin ex rel. State v. Public Service Commission. 32 There, the
court reasoned that the all writs provision "contemplates a situation
where the Court has already acquired jurisdiction."' 33
B. Uses
In Booth v. Wainwright, "I the supreme court issued an extraor-
dinary stay order based upon emergency security difficulties en-
countered by correctional authorities. The writ was granted in con-
junction with pending certiorari proceedings.
In State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 35 the court was asked to issue
a writ of prohibition to prevent the Judicial Qualifications Commit-
tee from proceeding against the relator. Finding no jurisdictional
issue to authorize prohibition relief, the court determined the mat-
ter pursuant to its all writs power.
All writs relief was also granted in State ex rel. Pettigrew v.
Kirk. 3 The relator there petitioned for a writ of quo warranto to
prevent a threatened exercise of power by the executive branch in
the appointment of additional circuit judges and in the issuance of
certain licenses. The court held quo warranto to be unavailable,
treating the petition instead as a request for all writs relief, "since
all the parties have appeared before the Court and argued the ques-
tions involved. '137
129. Id. at 3.
130. 295 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1974).
131. 150 Fla. 496, 8 So. 2d 19 (1942).
132. 333 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1976).
133. Id. at 12.
134. 300 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1974).
135. 295 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1974).
136. 243 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1970).
137. Id. at 149. Various other cases involving the exercise of all writs jurisdiction are not
detailed in this article. See e.g., Mize v. County of Seminole, 229 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1969);
Georgia S. '& Fla. Ry. v. Duval Connecting R.R., 193 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966).
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VIII. CERTIORARI
A. Common Law Writ of Certiorari
1. NATURE
The common law writ of certiorari may be issued where a lower
tribunal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or enters a ruling
which, by its failure to conform to essential legal requirements, is
reasonably likely to cause material injury."3 8 The writ will lie to
review interlocutory orders only where appeal is an inadequate rem-
edy.' 3' The common law writ of certiorari may be granted only by
those courts which are vested with appellate jurisdiction over the
tribunal whose order is challenged.1' *
2. JURISDICTION
The district courts of appeal"' and the circuit courts'42 are em-
powered to issue common law certiorari relief; the supreme court
lacks such authority."' As a jurisdictional prerequisite, a petition for
a writ of common law certiorari must be filed within thirty days of
rendition of the order to be reviewed."
Prior to implementation of the new Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure on March 1, 1978, common law certiorari relief was often
sought in the district courts to review circuit court interlocutory
decrees."5 The present rules provide for appellate review of specifi-
cally listed nonfinal orders;"'1 those decrees not named remain re-
138. Blacharski v. Watts, 268 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Dairyland Ins. Co. v.
McKenzie, 251 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); Gulf Cities Gas Corp. v. Cihak, 201 So. 2d
250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).
139. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. McKenzie, 251 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971).
140. Nellen v. State, 226 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969).
141. FIA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(3); see, e.g., Robinson v. State, 132 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1961).
142. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
143. Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 164 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1964). The supreme court had
been authorized to grant common law certiorari relief prior to the establishment of the district
courts of appeal, effective July 1, 1957. Id. at 210. The supreme court, however, continues to
apply the standard for common law certiorari relief in causes wherein the court "may issue
writs of certiorari to commissioners established by general law having statewide jurisdiction."
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3); see, e.g., Chicken 'N' Things v. Murray, 329 So. 2d 302 (Fla.
1976); Scholastic Sys. v. LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974).
144. FLA. R. App. P. 9.100(c). But see Lampkin-Asam v. District Court of Appeal, Third
Dist., 364 So. 2d 469 (1978), which held that the reviewing court is without appellate jurisdic-
tion if the notice of appeal is filed in the wrong court even though the notice is filed within
the 30-day limit.
145. See Haddad, The Common Law Writ of Certiorari in Florida, 29 U. FiA. L. REv.
207, 215 (1977).
146. FiA. R. App. P. 9.130 & .140. The Committee Notes to rule 9.130 provide: "It is
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viewable by common law certiorari. 4 ' Additionally, the district
courts have retained their authority to review by common law cer-
tiorari orders entered by the circuit courts in their appellate capaci-
ties. "'
3. USES
In the recent case of Simmons v.. Faust,4 ' the supreme court
resolved a conflict in the law by holding that orders issued by the
judicial referee of a medical mediation panel are reviewable by com-
mon law certiorari in the district courts of appeal.
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cooey, 5 interlocutory orders
rendered in connection with discovery proceedings were held review-
able by common law certiorari. The court reasoned that appeal is
an inadequate remedy for a party wrongfully ordered to disclose
information because the resultant damage from disclosure is ir-
reparable.
A different balance may be struck, however, between a privilege
of nondisclosure and an accused's right to identification evidence in
a criminal case. In State v. Moore,'5 the state petitioned for com-
mon law certiorari review of a discovery order directing it to disclose
the location of a secondary vehicle identification number. Although
the court upheld the defendant's right to verify the number, it did
so in a manner which recognized the demands of public policy to
maintain confidentiality of the location. Thus, the court modified
the trial court's order to require disclosure to an official court re-
porter who would verify its accuracy by way of a sealed transcript.
B. Certiorari in the Supreme Court of Florida
1. REVIEW 'OF DECISIONS IN THE DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL
The Supreme Court of Florida has the discretionary power to
review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal which
affects a class of constitutional or state officers, which passes upon
a question certified by a district court of appeal to be of great public
anticipated that since the most urgent interlocutory orders are appealable under this rule,
there will be very few cases where common law certiorari will provide relief."
147. See id. 9.130(a)(1).
148. See, e.g., Adlington v. State, 350 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Blacharski v.
Watts, 268 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
149. 358 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 1978).
150. 359 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
151. 356 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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interest, or which directly conflicts with a supreme court or district
court of appeal decision on the same question of law.'52
a. Decisions Affecting a Class of Constitutional or State Officers
The supreme court may review by certiorari "any decision of a
district court of appeal that affects a class of constitutional or state
officers."''  Spradley v. State' interpreted this provision as requir-
ing the decision of the district court to affect directly and exclu-
sively a particular class of constitutional officers.'55
Spradley limited the holding of Richardson v. State, 5 in which
the supreme court had reviewed a district court decision regarding
discovery requirements in criminal cases. In Richardson; the district
court decision was held to have affected two classes of constitutional
officers, state prosecutors and trial judges. Spradley receded from
Richardson to the extent that it authorized certiorari review of a
district court decision which affected, in any way, any segment of a
class of constitutional or state officers.'57
The continuing vitality of Spradley was demonstrated in
Shevin v. Cenville Communities, Inc. 118 The court there discharged
certiorari, reasoning that the decision of the district court affected
only one agency of the state government-the Department of Legal
Affairs-and not a class of constitutional officers. '59
Despite the Spradley holding, Richardson has been cited by the
supreme court as authority for granting certiorari. In State v.
Laiser, "I the court held that its certiorari jurisdiction had been
properly invoked to rule on the, validity of a search warrant because
"the district court's opinion affects all sheriffs of the state in the
performance of their duties. Richardson v. State. "I"
In Shuman v. State,' the supreme court granted a petition for
152. F A. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). For an extensive discussion of this area of certiorari
review, see Comment, Certiorari Review of District Court of Appeal Decisions by the Supreme
Court of Florida, 28 U. MtAMI L. REv. 952 (1974).
153. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
154. 293 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1974).
155. Id. at 701. The court stated: "To vest this Court with certiorari jurisdiction, a
decision must directly and, in some way, exclusively affect the duties, powers, validity,
formation, termination or regulation of a particular class of constitutional or state officers."
Id.; see Comment, supra note 152, at 956.
156. 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
157. 293 So. 2d at 701.
158. 338 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1976).
159, Id. at 1282 (England, J., concurring).
160. 322 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1975).
161. Id at 491.
162. 358 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1978).
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a writ of certiorari to review a district court decision. The issue
presented was whether costs for preparation of a transcript neces-
sary for an indigent's appeal from an order of involuntary hospitali-
zation should be taxed against the county in which the hearing was
held or against the office of the public defender appointed to repre-
sent the indigent. The court granted certiorari on the ground that
the decision of the district court, a per curiam affirmance without
opinion,'63 "affects a class of constitutional or state officers."' 64
In Taylor v. Tampa Electric Co. 65 and in Heath v. Becktell, 1
the supreme court granted certiorari, finding that the district court
decisions had affected a class of constitutional officers, clerks of the
circuit courts.' 7
Certiorari was granted in Murphy v. Mack,"'6 where the su-
preme court determined that a county sheriff is a public employee
within the meaning of certain statutory provisions. The court's exer-
cise of jurisdiction was supported by the Florida local government
constitutional provision designating sheriffs as "county officers."'' 9
b. Decisions Passing Upon Questions of Great Public Interest
The only recent development in this area has been the elimina-
tion of briefs on jurisdiction. 170 Under the former appellate rules a
brief on jurisdiction was permitted to support a petition for writ of
certiorari seeking review of a district court decision which had
passed on a question certified by the district court as being of great
public interest.' 7' Under the present rules, however, no such brief is
permitted;' the petitioner need only file the requisite notices. 73
In Revitz v. Baya, 17' the supreme court was asked to review a
decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in which the
163. Shuman v. State, 339 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (per curiam).
164. 358 So. 2d at 1334. The district court had affirmed a trial court order directing
taxation of costs against the public defender. Apparently, the constitutional or state officers
involved were public defenders, whose duties are prescribed by FLA. CONST. art. V. § 18 and
FLA. STAT. § 27.51 (1975).
165. 356 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1978).
166. 327 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1976).
167. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 16 supports the conclusion that clerks are constitutional
officers.
168. 341 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 1977).
169. FLA. CONST. art. VEI[, § 1(d).
170. For earlier cases on questions of great public interest, see Comment, supra note 152,
at 956-63.
171. Fla. R. App. P. 4.5(c)(6) (1962).
172. FLA. R. App. P. 9.120(d).
173. Id. 9.120(b).
174. 355 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1977).
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district court had certified a question.' The supreme court ruled
that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Third District decision,
since the district court had specifically found it unnecessary to pass
upon the certified question. 7
c. Decisions Conflicting on the Same Question of Law
The power of the Supreme Court of Florida to review by certior-
ari per curiam decisions without opinions has been strongly de-
bated. "' In AB CTC v. Morejon,75 two justices'79 of the supreme
court voted to overrule Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., s0 which had
authorized the court to review district court affirmances rendered
without opinion. One of the two justices recently conceded that his
view was a minority one, concluding that "a majority of the Court
seem inclined to continue 'finding' conflict in those district court
decisions they do not like."''
In Mystan Marine, Inc. v. Harrington, s2 however, a majority of
the supreme court did agree to narrow its jurisdiction. The court
held that denial of certiorari without opinion by a district court
lacks precedential value and is thus beyond the constitutional scope
of the certiorari review authority of the court.
2. INTERLOCUTORY CERTIORARI
The supreme court may review by certiorari "any interlocutory
order passing upon a matter which upon final judgment would be
directly appealable to the supreme court.' '8
In Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 8 the court
175. Baya v. Revitz, 345 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
176. 355 So. 2d at 1171-72. The district court had stated: "'We, therefore, do not reach
the question of whether it is an abuse of process to appeal any consent judgment, nor do we
discuss the damage issue.'" Id. at 1171, quoting Baya v. Revitz, 345 So. 2d at 341 (emphasis
added by supreme court).
177. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 152, at 967-69; Commentary, Establishing New
Criteria for Conflict Certiorari n Per Curiam District Court Decisions: A First Step Toward
a Definition of Power, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 335 (1977).
178. 324 So. 2d 625 (1975).
179. Justices England and Overton.
180. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
181. National Airlines, Inc. v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. 1976) (England, J.,
dissenting). Justice England, continuing his opposition to many grants of conflict certiorari,
dissented in a later case in which there was an opinion below, and said that the majority, in
finding conflict where he thought none existed, "obliterates any vestige of finality in the
district courts" and "pervert[s] Article V of the Constitution." Lubell v. Roman Spa, Inc.,
362 So. 2d 922, 923-24 (Fla. 1978) (England, J., dissenting).
182. 339 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1976).
183. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
184. 290 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1974).
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distinguished this provision from that of article V, section 3(b)(1),
of the Constitution of the State of Florida, which states that the
court shall hear appeals from orders of trial courts initially and
directly passing on the validity of a state statute. In order to effec-
tuate the interlocutory certiorari provision, the court held that arti-
cle V, section 3(b)(1) must be read to allow appeal as a matter of
right only from final orders of trial courts initially and directly pass-
ing on the validity of a state statute.1'1
3. CERTIORARI REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF COMMISSIONS
The supreme court may review by certiorari decisions of com-
missions established by general law which have statewide jurisdic-
tion. '6 Only final decisions of these commissions are reviewable' 7
and such review is in all instances discretionary. 8' In these proceed-
ings, the court applies the identical test utilized by lower courts in
common law certiorari cases: the court looks to Whether the decision
under review departs from the essential requirements of the law.'89
The court will not reverse a commission finding unless there is no
competent evidence to support the determination below' 0 or exist-
ing evidence is so insubstantial as to make the finding "arbitrary
and capricious."''
IX. PROCEDURE
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100 applies to proceed-
ings which invoke the jurisdiction of the supreme court, district
courts of appeal and circuit courts for the issuance of writs of man-
damus, prohibition, quo warranto, habeas corpus and "all writs
185. Id. at 16-17.
186. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). ,',,H
187. See, e.g., Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mason, 186 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1966) (per
curiam).
188. In Scholastic Sys., Inc. v. LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974), the supreme court
concluded that there was no constitutional requirement for mandatory review of administra-
tive agency action when the commission procedure itself provided for an appeal as of right.
The court stated: "This court has from time to time reconsidered the manner in which it can
best utilize its judicial resources within the framework of its extensive constitutional jurisdic-
tion; otherwise, it would become physically impossible to give proper consideration to all
cases which equally demand our careful review." Id. at 168.
The court noted that the constitution gives it "the power of direct review of administra-
tive action." FLA. CONST. art. V., § 3(b)(7), but decided that the grant of power did not
mandate its use. 307 So. 2d at 168-69.
189. 307 So. 2d at 168. See also, Chicken 'N' Things v. Murray, 329 So. 2d 302 (Fla.
1976). : 1. 
190. Chicken 'N' Things v. Murray, 329 So. 2d 302,. 305 (Fla. 1976).
191. Id.
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necessary to the complete exercise of the courts' jurisdiction.'""2 The
rule also applies to the certiorari jurisdiction of the district courts
of appeal and circuit courts, and to the interlocutory certiorari juris-
diction of the supreme court."' Certiorari proceedings to review or-
ders of the district courts of appeal by the supreme court are gov-
erned by rule 9.120.
A. Rule 9.100
Original jurisdiction of the court is invoked under this rule by
filing with the clerk of the court a petition accompanied by the
appropriate fee." ' A petition for a writ of common law certiorari
must be filed within thirty days after rendition of the order to be
reviewed."' Apart from common law certiorari, no express time
limit governs the filing."' When the relief sought is directed to a
lower tribunal, the petition must be accompanied by an appendix." 7
Each petition must reflect the basis for invoking jurisdiction,"s
the relevant facts,"' and the nature of the relief sought.2°0 Although
briefs are not authorized, supporting argument, with appropriate
citation of authority, must be offered.20' Additional procedural re-
quirements may be applicable. 02
If the pleadings demonstrate a preliminary basis for relief, the
court may issue an order to show cause.103 In prohibition proceed-
192. FLA. R. App. P. 9.100(a).
193. Id.
194. Id. 9.100(b).
195. Id. 9.100(c). "Rendition" is defined in rule 9.020(g) as "the filing of a signed, written
order with the clerk of the lower tribunal," absent pending posttrial motions. Rule 9.100(c)
also provides that a copy of the petition shall be furnished to the person issuing the order in
question. But see, Lampkin-Asam v. District Court of Appeal, Third Dist., 364 So. 2d 469
(Fla. 1978).
196. The doctrine of laches, however, may apply. Cf. State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee, 142
Fla. 154, 159, 194 So. 315, 317 (1940) (per curiam) (mandamus generally regarded as not
within statutes of limitation applicable to ordinary actions, but it is subject to the equitable
doctrine of laches). *
197. FLA. R. App. P. 9.100(e). Rule 9.220 prescribes the format of the appendix.
198. Id. 9.100(e)(1).
199. Id. 9.100(e)(2).
200. Id. 9.100(e)(3).
201. Id. 9.100(e)(4).
202. See FLA. STAT. § 79.01 (1977), which provides that a petition for writ of habeas
corpus must demonstrate illegal detention by affidavit or evidence. Section 81.011 requires
that a petition for writ of prohibition be verified by affidavit of the petitioner or his attorney
when the facts alleged are not matters of record. When the matters appear on the face of the
7)r...edings in the body presuming to exercise jurisdiction, a certified transcript of the record
of all the proceedii.gs ui--t accc-nanv the ,etitio. See also FLA. R. Cir. P. 1.640, 1.660,
1.680.
203. FLA. R. App. P. 9.100(f).
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ings, issuance of the order stays further proceedings in the lower
tribunal. 04 Within the time set by the court, the respondent may file
and serve an appropriate response which may include argument,
citation of authority and a supplemental appendix. 05 The petitioner
may file a reply and supplemental appendix within twenty days of
the service of the response.0 6 Final disposition by the court entails
either issuance of the final order 07 or discharge of the rule to show
cause.
B. Rule 9.120
Certiorari jurisdiction of the supreme court to review decisions
of the district courts of appeal is invoked by filing two copies of a
notice of certiorari, accompanied by the appropriate fee, with the
clerk of the district court within thirty days after rendition of the
order to be reviewed.208
Petitioner's brief, restricted to the question of jurisdiction,
must be served within ten days of filing the notice. 209 When jurisdic-
tion is predicated upon a district court decision passing on a ques-
tion certified to be of great public interest, no brief on jurisdiction
regarding that issue may be filed. 210 Respondent's brief on jurisdic-
tion must be served within twenty days of service of petitioner's
brief; a reply brief may be served ten days thereafter .21
In the event the supreme court denies the petition for certiorari,
the cause is concluded; no motion for rehearing is permitted. 12 If the
court accepts jurisdiction or postpones decision, the petitioner shall
serve a brief on the merits within twenty days after rendition of the
order accepting or postponing.2 13 Additional briefs are to be served
as prescribed by rule 9.210. If the supreme court enters an order
204. Id.
205. Id. 9.100(h).
206. Id. 9.100(i).
207. In mandamus and prohibition, the final order is also known as the preemptory writ
or writ absolute; it is referred to as the judgment of ouster in quo warranto. The final decree
in habeas corpus is labeled a "final judgment in habeas," and may compel various forms of
relief, including discharge of the petitioner, admission of the petitioner to bail, or other relief
appropriate under the facts of the case.
208. FLA. R. App. P. 9.120(b). To avoid dismissal of the petition, the notice should be
substantially in the form prescribed by rule 9.900. But see Lampkin-Asam v. District Court
of Appeal, Thiid,6ik., 364 Ss. 2 , 499.(Fla. 1978).
209. FiA. R. App. P. 9.120(d).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. 9.330(d).
213. Id. 9.120(f).
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accepting jurisdiction, the parties and the district court shall be
notified and, within sixty days after rendition of the decree, the
clerk of the district court shall transmit the record.21
214. Id. 9.120(e).
